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Graphical abstract 
 
 
Abstract 
 
System scenarios derived from requirements specification play an important 
role in the early software reliability engineering. A great deal of research effort 
has been devoted to predict reliability of a system at early design stages. The 
existing approaches are unable to handle scalability and calculation of 
scenarios reliability for large systems. This paper proposes modeling of 
scenarios in a scalable way by using a scenario language that describes 
system scenarios in a compact and concise manner which can results in a 
reduced number of scenarios. Furthermore, it proposes a calculation strategy 
to achieve better traceability of scenarios, and avoid computational 
complexity. The scenarios are pragmatically modeled and translated to finite 
state machines, where each state machine represents the behaviour of 
component instance within the scenario. The probability of failure of each 
component exhibited in the scenario is calculated separately based on the 
finite state machines. Finally, the reliability of the whole scenario is calculated 
based on the components’ behaviour models and their failure information 
using modified mathematical formula. In this paper, an example related to a 
case study of an automated railcar system is used to verify and validate the 
proposed strategy for scalability of system modeling.  
 
Keywords: Reliability engineering, architecture-based reliability, scenario-
based reliability, component-based software, software quality 
 
Abstrak 
 
Senario sistem yang diperolehi daripada spesifikasi keperluan memainkan 
peranan yang penting didalam kejuruteraan kebolehpercayaan perisian. 
Usaha yang besar telah ditumpukan dalam bidang penyelidikan untuk 
meramal kebolehpercayaan sistem di peringkat awalan rekabentuk sistem. 
Pendekatan yang sedia ada tidak mampu untuk mengendalikan pengiraan 
dan penskalaan kebolehpercayaan senario bagi sistem yang besar. Kertas 
penyelidikan ini mencadangkan memodelkan senario yang merangkumi 
penskalaan yang besar dengan menggunakan bahasa senario yang 
mampu menerangkan senario sistem dengan padat dan tepat dimana akan 
berhasil untuk mengurangkan jumlah senario. Tambahan, penyelidikan ini 
juga mencadangkan strategi pengiraan untuk mencapai aliran senario yang 
lebih baik dan mengelakkan kerumitan pengkomputeran. Senario-senario ini 
secara teknikalnya dimodelkan dan ditafsirkan kepada mesin keadaan 
terhingga dimana setiap mesin keadaan mewakili tingkahlaku komponen 
didalam sesuatu senario. Kebarangkalian kegagalan bagi setiap komponen 
yang ditunjukkan menerusi senario dikira secara berasingan berdasarkan 
mesin keadaan terhingga. Akhirnya, kebolehpercayaan kesemua senario 
dikira menggunakan formula matematik yang telah diubah berdasarkan 
tingkahlaku model komponen dan maklumat berkaitan kegagalan sistem. 
Kajian kes iaitu sistem automatik kereta api telah digunakan untuk 
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mengesahkan strategi yang dicadangkan untuk penskalaan permodelan 
system. 
 
Kata kunci: Kebolehpercayaan kejuruteraan, kebolehpercayaan berasaskan 
senibina, kebolehpercayaan berasaskan scenario, perisian berasaskan 
komponen, kualiti perisian 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Failure of software can lead to critical events and fatal 
consequences in safety-critical applications as well as 
in business applications. In order to meet customer 
expectations and needs, the software must have high 
reliability. Increasing demands on software 
functionalities are leading to various issues, which 
include the scalability and degree of concurrency of 
the software system. Customer satisfaction is also a 
serious challenge; thus software reliability engineering 
should live up to today’s complex software systems 
and their specific challenges. 
The reliability approach is formalized to explain the 
failure behaviour within the system. Software reliability 
is defined as the probability that the software system 
will perform a required function correctly (failure free) 
in a stated environment for a specified period of time 
[1, 2]. Due to the heterogeneity of the execution 
environment and the development methodology of 
the current software systems, a failure broadly can 
mean that the software system is unable to deliver the 
expected service and is not capable of resuming its 
service as it was not interrupted. Several kinds of 
failures are possible during service execution, such as 
faults in the implementation of the software 
components, hardware failure and network failure. 
Hardware failure is due to an unreliable hardware 
resource, and network failure is just because the 
message is lost or there is a problem in inter-
component communication [3, 4]. Predicting software 
reliability at design-time enables the software designer 
to identify weak design spots, which would be more 
cost-effective to improve than fixing consequent errors 
at later implementation phases. Therefore, the 
reliability approach must be able to work at the early 
design stage, and particularly during the architectural 
design. 
During the last decade, researchers have proposed 
many approaches to predict reliability depending 
upon architectural design and targeting design-time 
specification. These approaches address different 
problems and challenges. However, extension of a 
scenario specification toward partial behaviour 
modeling is integral part that should be considered to 
predict the reliability based on the architecture [5, 6]. 
Except for certain approach [7], which we will discuss 
in the related work, most of the current approaches [8-
17] compute the reliability based upon large 
behavioural models, without taking into account the 
scalability problem (e.g., dealing with applications 
consist of a large number of components). 
To address the problem of scalability, a partial 
behaviour modeling approach is presented in this 
paper using expressive scenario specification 
language and finite state machine. The scenario 
language describes system scenarios in a compact 
and concise manner that enables the system engineer 
to model the system in fewer scenarios. The finite state 
machine explains the basic states of the scenario and 
helps in computation along limited space so as to 
avoid the computational complexity. 
The rest of the paper is divided into six sections. 
Section 2 describes the research background. Section 
3 describes in brief the proposed strategy. The details 
of behaviour modeling are given in Sections 4. The 
reliability calculation strategy is given in Section 5. 
Furthermore, Section 6 is about related work and it 
compares and classifies the current works based on 
the proposed strategy. Section 7 concludes the 
research and identifies future research directions. 
 
 
2.0  BACKGROUND 
 
This section briefly defines and reviews the concepts of 
system scenarios and behaviour models, on which we 
base our modeling and calculation of system 
scenarios. The running example that used to illustrate 
the different proposed aspects is also introduced. 
Finally, an outline is given which illustrates the 
proposed strategy. 
 
2.1  System Scenarios and Behaviour Models 
 
Two common ways for describing and documenting 
system requirements specification have been found 
very useful in practice, particularly at earlier stages of 
system design. One is scenarios based that describes 
how the different components in the system interact, 
for example, UML sequence diagrams (SD), and 
Message Sequence Charts (MSC) [18]. The other way is 
state description language that describes and defines 
conditions and constraints among the internal states of 
individual components, for example, Object Constraint 
Language (OCL) [19], and VDM Specification 
Language (VDM-SL) [20]. 
Live Sequence Charts (LSC) [21] is scenario based 
language that provides syntactic and semantic 
support both ways for behaviour modeling. It was 
introduced to overcome the shortcomings of SD and 
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MSC by adding liveness. LSC equipped to describe 
alternative and repetitive behaviour, synchronous, 
asynchronous, data values on messages, and symbolic 
instances. In addition, there are characteristics that 
enable making explicit causality relations between 
different behaviours by means of conditional, 
triggered and pre-empted behaviour. LSC describes 
system scenarios in two types of charts: an existential 
live sequence charts (eLSC) and a universal sequence 
charts (uLSC). eLSC are more like MSC and SD [22]. The 
eLSC scenarios define an example of system 
behaviour, and must be satisfied through at least one 
system run. The uLSC scenarios describe a rule that all 
system behaviour is expected to satisfy; they 
encapsulate a conditional behaviour as action and 
reaction, using a pre-chart and main chart: once the 
pre-chart occurs, the main chart must occur. The 
reason being that during the requirements obtained 
from the domain knowledge, there is a progressive 
movement from existential statements, in the formula 
of examples and use-cases to universal statements in 
the formula of declarative properties. Most important 
point of uLSC scenarios, they document the last 
confirmation of the system requirements specification. 
Thus, behaviour models generated from them are 
more accurate than the behaviour models build from 
other charts. 
In this research work, the system requirements 
specification is described by extended uLSC charts 
and OCL. The extended uLSC is part of this paper’s 
contribution (defined in section 4.1). Then these 
specifications are translated to a set of finite state 
machines (FSM). FSM are simply  directed  graphs,  with  
nodes  denoting  states, and  arrows  (labelled  with  
the  triggering  events  and  guarding  conditions)  
denoting transitions [23]. FSM describes the dynamic 
behaviour of system in a sequential flow. Most of 
behaviour modeling approaches converts FSMs to 
other type of state representation graphs such as 
statecharts [23], Labeled Transition System (LTS) [24], 
and Modal Transition System (MTS)[25], in order to 
expressively allow for more compact representation of 
large and complex software systems. However, in this 
research work, calculation of reliability was built upon 
the basic behaviour models without the need of 
integration to complex behaviour models. 
 
2.2  Running Example 
 
An ongoing example is used in this paper to illustrate 
the proposed strategy. The automated railcar system 
presented in [26], and already used in our previous 
work [27] is selected as the ongoing example. Because 
our main goal is to improve our previous work by 
achieving more scalability via reducing number of 
scenarios, thus, use of this example can ease the 
comparison. The railcar system consists of six terminals 
located on a cyclic path, and each pair of adjacent 
terminals is linked by two rail tracks. Many railcars are 
existed to carriage passengers between terminals. A 
number of scenarios have been depicted in the 
previous work [27], for ease of illustration, in this paper 
our focusing will be on two of them: scenario of car 
approaching to the terminal with stopping at that 
terminal (scenario 1 in Figure 1), and scenario of car 
approaching to the terminal with passing the terminal 
(scenario 2 in Figure 1). The scenarios consisted of four 
components named: proxSensor, cruiser, car, and 
carHandler. The details of the scenarios are depicted 
in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 Portion of Railcar system specifications 
 
 
3.0  THE PROPOSED STRATEGY 
 
The proposed strategy has four steps as detailed 
below. These steps are distributed into two phases, 
behaviour modeling (Section 4.0) and reliability 
calculation (Section 5.0). 
 Describing of system scenarios using extended 
uLSC notations. 
 Annotation of scenario specification using system 
constraints 
 Translation of annotated scenarios to FSMs. 
 Determination of components’ criticalities. 
 Calculation of scenarios reliability. 
The strategy starts by describing system scenarios 
using enhanced scenario language and annotate 
these scenarios by system constraints. After scenarios 
preparation, we take a step-by-step approach. First, a 
finite state machine is constructed for each 
component instance as part of the scenario; the 
failure probability associated to this instance is 
calculated by treating this part of the scenario 
separately. Hence, the computation conducts along 
limited space to avoid the computation complexity. 
The failure probability of the components reveals the 
criticality of those components regarding to the 
scenario and then the system. Second, the probability 
failure and the related reliability of the whole scenario 
are calculated based the sequences of the finite state 
machines. Tackling scenarios independently in 
reliability engineering potentially helps in the 
construction of the system global behaviour model 
without the need the system’s internal states 
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(components interactions), in turn, avoiding the state 
space explosion problem. Figure 2 depicts the strategy 
phases and steps. 
 
 
Figure 2 The proposed strategy phases and steps 
 
 
Modeling phase focuses on moving from scenario-
based specification to state based specification. 
Unlike most of reliability approaches, in the modeling 
we move from system specification explicitly. Most 
approaches rely on Markov notations directly (state 
based specification) as a primary modeling notation 
without describing how the states generated. In the 
calculation phase, the calculation conducts partially. 
Given the state specification of the scenarios, the 
calculation adopts mathematical formula to tackle 
the state space partially. The following sections 
describe the phases in details.  
 
 
4.0  BEHAVIOUR MODELING 
 
By documenting the behaviour of the system in two 
different and complementary ways of requirements 
specification (as scenarios notations (e.g. uLSC) and 
constraints (e.g. OCL)), the architects of the system are 
forced to truly understand the requirements 
specification and the behaviour implied by them. In 
Figure 1, the requirements specifications are 
documented by uLSC. As mentioned before, the 
characteristic of uLSC compared to eLSC and other 
scenario notations, they give the last confirmation of 
the requirements specification. Unfortunately, use of 
uLSC as single scenarios notation produces increase 
number of scenarios (each action and its reaction 
documented separately). In case of large software 
systems there is need for a scenario language that can 
reduce the number of the scenarios. Thus, the uLSC 
notations are extended to hold more than one 
scenario specifications, by adopting constructs from 
UML 2.0 SD[28]. 
 
4.1  Moving from uLSC to Extended uLSC 
 
In the scenario description, an extended form of uLSC 
is used, which includes additional constructs. Part of 
these constructs is adopted from UML 2.0 SD such as 
interaction combined fragment with alt operator. The 
idea was to constructs an uLSC that is able to combine 
more than one uLSC bases on the similarity between 
triggers. After unifying the pre-chart of scenarios, the 
main charts are combined via a combined fragment 
notation with alt operator.  A combined fragment is 
expression of an interaction by a box contains a subset 
of messages and is defined by an operator (e.g. alt), 
which states the connection between the fragment's 
messages.  An alt is an operator which denotes that 
the messages within the fragment are alternatives to 
each other.  Each alternative has a guard and 
contains the interaction that occurs when the 
condition for that guard is met. Only one of the 
conditions can occur at the same time. An 'alt' 
combined fragment is similar to nested if-then-else and 
switch/case constructs in programming languages. 
Conditions in the guards can be described as implied 
triggers. Figure 3 depicts the extension idea by 
drawing a single uLSC holding scenario 1 and scenario 
2 of the running example. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 The extended uLSC combing scenario 1 and 
scenario 2 of railcar system 
 
 
4.2  Annotate the Scenario Specification by System 
Constraints 
 
The general purpose is to construct a FSM for each 
component instance within the scenario, therefore, 
information that reveals the component states 
separately is needed. As the proposed work intended 
for early design stages (i.e. when complete information 
about the behaviour of a component is not available), 
there is no option other than to leverage on system 
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constraints and their state variables as basic 
information sources to depict the component's 
behavior precisely. The constraints and their state 
variables (called as a set, state vector) are already 
provided as domain knowledge related to early 
design specification. For example, the state vector of 
the railcar system based on the constraints shown in 
Figure 1 is: < “idle, cruising, arrival”>. 
Component state vector is a vector holding a state 
variable(s) elicited from the system state vector and its 
values represent the component state before and 
after each operation (message). The component state 
vector is employed in the strategy to annotate the 
scenario specification based on the system constraints. 
The following steps give details of how component 
state vector elicited and then how it can be 
employed to annotate the scenario specifications. 
  
i) Elicit component’s state vector:  
 
Component state vector uses as pre- and post-
conditions to component’s operations invocation 
(incoming and outgoing messages). Therefore, in order 
to elicit component state vector, following procedures 
are needed. Firstly, the determination of component’s 
incoming and outgoing messages. Secondly, the 
addition of each state variable appears in the 
preconditions of the outgoing messages to 
component’s state vector. Finally, the addition of 
each state variable modified by the component’s 
incoming or outgoing messages to the component’s 
state vector. The previous procedures can be defined 
formally as follows: 
 
Definition 1:  (Sets of component’s incoming and 
outgoing messages):  
Let compom and compim be the sets of outgoing and 
incoming message of the component i (compi) 
respectively.  compi extended uLSC , a message 
mi   extended uLSC will be added to the compom iff 
mi sent by the compi to other components within the 
extended uLSC; and mi will be added to the compim iff 
it was received by compi from other components 
within the extended uLSC. 
 
Definition 2: (State vector and pre-conditions):  
Let compsv be a component’s state vector. mi
compom  if   mi matching opname   system 
constraints, then the state variable that appear in the 
preconds of the opname will be added to the compsv iff is 
not already existing in compsv. 
 
Definition 3: (state vector and the modified variables): 
mi(compom   compim ) if   mi matching opname 
  system constraints, and the value of preconds of the 
opname does not matching the value of  postconds, then 
the state variables related to the preconds or postconds  
will be added to the compsv iff does not already 
existed in compsv. 
For example, according to these definitions and the 
railcar constraints, the state vector of the car 
component is < idle, cruising, arrival >, cruiser: < idle, 
cruising>, the proxSensor: < cruising, arrival >, and the 
carHandler component is: < arrival >. 
 
ii) Scenario annotation and propagation: 
 
After the elicitation of the state vector of each 
component, annotation and propagation of the 
component’s within the scenario can be conducted 
similar to the techniques in [29] and [30]. The goal of 
the annotation procedure is to enrich component 
information by defining the system state from a 
component’s perspective before and after execution 
of each operation depicted in the scenario. In this 
procedure, firstly, annotation parameters are built 
based on variables of the state vector and their values 
in the system constraints (e.g. see Figure 4 below). The 
annotation values before and after each operation is 
determined according to the system constraints. Some 
operations (messages) may not be given a 
specification specifying system state before or after; 
so, secondly, the propagation process is used to 
propagate unknown values (?) in (before and after) 
the annotations. Propagation is executed using the 
technique in [29]. Figure 4(a) shows annotation result 
of our running example and Figure 4(b) shows the 
annotation result after the propagation. 
 
 
Figure 4 (a) Annotation result of railcar example (b) The 
annotation after propagation 
 
 
3.3  Translate the Annotated Scenario to FSMs 
 
Once the scenarios are prepared (annotated and 
propagated), the first step is to generate a set of FSMs. 
This process starts through the construction of a FSM for 
each component instance within the extended uLSC 
scenario. Given an extended uLSC m, let 
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(S,S ,S ,T)0
iFm b  be a FSM synthesized from instance i in 
m. The basic idea is to construct a state for each state 
vector value. Thus, S is the set of states corresponding 
to the state vector values along the instance. S0 
contains exactly the state corresponding to the first 
state vector value. Sb contains state corresponding to 
the branching state vector value if it existed (first state 
vector value in the combined fragment box). T is a 
transition relation labelled with associated messages 
sent or received by the instance. Figure 5, shows FSMs 
for railcar system components translated from the 
scenario in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 The obtained FSMs of the railcar system components 
 
 
5.0  RELIABILITY CALCULATION 
 
Once the FSMs of the scenario are given, scenario’s 
reliability can be calculated. The calculation builds 
upon mathematical formula tackling each FSM 
separately to avoid the computation complexity. The 
following sub sections defines calculation formulas and 
discusses calculation results. 
 
5.1  Calculation Formulas and Failure Information 
 
Let comp1, comp2,…, compK denote the K 
components participated in scenario Scj . Let fi be the 
failure probability of the component compi and 
assume fi’s to be known. Let ni be the number of 
invocation of component i within the scenario Scj. 
Recall that fij is the probability that the ith component 
(compi) fails in the jth scenario (Scj). The value of fij can 
be computed by [31]: 
 
1 (1 ) i
n
ij if f                           (Eq.1) 
 
From Equation (1), assuming that component failure 
probabilities are independent, the scenario failure 
probability fSc j can be derived as: 
1
1 (1 ) i
j
K
n
Sc i
i
f f

                             (Eq. 2) 
Design specifications depicted by our scenario 
description notation can reveal both structural and 
behavioural inconsistencies among component 
interaction. However, identification and classification 
of these inconsistences are beyond the scope of this 
paper. In particular, they reveal directional errors as 
well as mismatches among interface signatures and 
pre- and post-conditions, more details about such 
type of errors can be found in [32]. However, all these 
errors are related to components required and 
provided services which implemented via component 
operations, thus, all these types of errors are 
abstracted and encapsulated in operations’ failure 
probability. In the previous work [27], the failure 
probability of the whole component is used as failure 
information required as  an input for equation (2) in 
order to calculate reliability of scenario. In this paper, 
to be more accurate, the failure probability of 
operations will be used as alternatives to component 
failure. This use due to the fact that component failure 
estimates or calculates as a function of the entire 
component states, while in each interaction moment, 
only specific set of operations participates in the 
failure. 
By observing to the scenario descriptions, for 
example, the operations that a component executes 
at each specific time can be identified exactly. 
Following this line of thinking, fi  can be replaced with 
a set of operation failure probabilities lf i , where 
,...,1l l ln  is the index of the operation within the 
component. Equation (1), in this case, becomes: 
 
1
1 (1 )
nl
l
ij i
l l
f f

                                   (Eq. 3) 
 
Failure information needed now is the probabilities 
of failure of the operation such as the information 
shown in Table 1 which is related to the operations 
invoked in the railcar system. As mentioned previously, 
the failure information will be tackled abstractly, 
therefore, this paper’s illustration is not limited to 
specific type of error, a preliminary estimate of lf i , 
could be, for example, some approaches [33] [34] 
derived such errors by analyzing the dynamic 
complexity and dynamic connectors coupling and 
severity levels of their failures of every component and 
its operations. The number of nodes and transitions in 
the FSM of the component can be used as other 
parameters of the complexity assessments. In case of 
using UML, statecharts diagrams and Timed Sequence 
Diagrams may reveal information about the length of 
component’s busy period which can also be utilized as 
parameters of failure rate estimation [31]. 
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Table 1 Failure information of each operation in the railcar 
scenario 
Operation name Probability of failure  
alert100 0.002 
arriveReq 0.01 
arriveAck 0.004 
alertStop 0.004 
disengage 0.001 
stop 0.001 
passTerminal 0.004 
 
 
From Equation (3), assuming that component failure 
probabilities are independent, the scenario failure 
probability fSc j defined in equation (2) can be 
updated by replacing the new formula of fij defined in 
equation (3); thus fSc j will be: 
 
11
1 (1 )
n
j
lK
l
Sc i
i l l
f f
 
                          (Eq. 4) 
 
Note that equation (3) and (4) are only feasible 
under the assumptions that: an operation’s failure 
probability does not depend on the failure 
probabilities of other operations and the scenario is a 
sequential structure. Unfortunately, important 
enhancement made by extend uLSC is the propose of 
branching notation, this in the most cases will produce 
branching scenarios (e.g. see FSMs of car and cruiser 
components in Figure 4); thus, for more accurate, in 
case of branching scenario, for equation (3) and (4) 
the calculation can be done by considering each 
branch as a sequential structure, and then taking the 
mean of the branches before the subtraction from 1. 
The scenario reliability can be defined as the 
probability of not being in a failure state; thus reliability 
of scenario Scj is computed as: 
 
1
Sc jj
ScR f                            (Eq. 5) 
 
5.2  Results of Calculation and Discussion 
 
Once FSMs of the scenario have been derived from 
the extended uLSC where, each FSM represents a 
component instance, the next step is to calculate the 
reliability of the scenario.  Using Equation (3) and 
values of the expected failure of the operations 
invoked by the component, the probability of 
component failure is calculated. By calling back our 
railcar system the probabilities of failure of the 
components proxSensor, cruiser, car, and carHandler 
are: 0.0059920, 0.002995, 0.0208480, and 0.0139600 
respectively. These values denote to the criticality of 
these components regarding to the scenario and then 
the system. Applying Equation (4), if the branching 
structure of the components is not considered, the 
probability of failure of the whole scenario will be 
0.050818. Based on this failure probability and using 
Equation (5), the reliability of the scenario is 0.949182. 
By considering the branching structure of cruiser and 
car components (taking mean of branches failure) 
probability of failure of the scenario will be 0.047004 
and thus reliability of the scenario is 0.952996. The 
difference between the reliability values in the case of 
considering versus ignoring the branching structure is 
0.003814. This difference in some applications, may 
seems relatively small, however, in the case of long 
branches, the difference can be significant. Thus, 
considering the weighted mean value would be 
deemed helpful. Furthermore, a weighted mean that 
takes into account the number of states in the 
branches represent a more accurate model of the 
actual system. 
Summing up, the scenario reliabilities calculation 
based on the system requirements specifications have 
been discussed. These specifications were modeled 
through a scalable scenario description (the scenario 
modeled in a compact and concise manner). After 
the scenarios calculation stage, the system global 
behaviour model can be constructed in hierarchical 
(e.g. see [7]) or flat (e.g. see [24]). In the global 
behaviour model of the system, the scenarios can 
represent the basic elements as alternative to the 
components potentially reducing the complexity of 
the system global structure (e.g. a software system 
may consist hundreds of components). Each scenario 
will represent node in the structure. The relation and 
connections among these nodes (scenarios) will be 
determined based on the information of the system 
specification (e.g. eLSCs and system documents) and 
operational profile artifact, which can describe the 
related and unrelated behaviours. After global model 
construction, reliability of the system can be 
computed using any reliability technique [10, 35] or 
formula [13, 36] that provided to utilize system 
structures and behaviour in the prediction. 
 
 
6.0  RELATED WORK 
 
During the last decade, researchers proposed several 
approaches to predict reliability at the design-time 
utilizing the architectural design of the software system 
and the interaction scenarios of components; these 
approaches address different problems and 
challenges. For the sake of brevity, a brief overview of 
the approaches of greatest interest to the scope of 
this paper’s work is provided. The approaches 
classified to two groups, bases on their closeness to this 
paper’s work. 
The first group comprises the approaches [7, 24, 31, 
37, 38], which can be regarded as more closed to the 
proposed work. Roshandel et al. [37], show how the 
component behavioural views can be modeled by a 
Quartert model which is used to model four views 
named interface, static view, dynamic view, and 
interaction protocol. These views are used to classify 
the architectural defects. The significant defects are 
used in the reliability prediction technique as failure 
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states. The architecture analysis is used based on 
Quartert views to reveal the potential problems of 
design and implementation. Result of architecture 
analysis are built based on Quartert views of this work 
and can be used as input to the proposed strategy in 
this paper. However, in the work [37] and [24] the total 
behaviour of system is represented by a flat model. 
The flat model as reported in [7] suffers from scalability 
problem. The main reason for these problems is the 
number of states which is also known as state 
explosion problem, exactly, in the case of large 
systems. Authors of [7] proposed extension to the work 
in [37] by modeling and calculating system scenarios 
hierarchically. The hierarchical method can provide 
solution in the case of large systems, especially when 
the synchronization nature of the system 
implementation is taken into account [6]. However 
language of scenario description is message 
sequence charts in classical form. Thus, the description 
of system scenarios in a compact and concise manner 
toward archiving  scalability is not addressed by the 
approaches in [7] and even in[38]. Moreover, there is 
no new calculation strategies that consider 
computation complexity are presented in most of 
these approaches. 
In the second group the approaches [3, 4] address 
the utilization of usage profiles and the component 
environment, to predict the system reliability in the 
deployment environment of the system. In [4] the 
previous usage information which is named as 
architectural kens and defined as a parameters store 
the error probability of component, while there are no 
specifications about how the values are obtained. The 
work in [3] extends the ideas in [4] by  utilizing the 
usage profiles. Furthermore, this approach includes 
hardware factor (failures caused by communication 
links or hardware) in the reliability calculation. The 
usage-proﬁle is built upon parameter dependencies. 
The parameters dependencies concept is about the 
influence of the input values on the control and data 
flow. These values are derived from the usage 
scenarios by domain expert and treated as a 
stochastic expression and the probability distribution of 
the failure. However, unlike our proposed work, these 
approaches focus on the structural aspects rather 
than the behavioural aspects of the component 
interactions. 
Comparatively, our work enhances the work of the 
first group, that is, by adding more scalability by using 
extended scenario description language that 
describes the system scenarios in a compact and 
concise manner. Furthermore, our work provides 
promising scenario calculation strategy, treated the 
calculation partially. In fact, unlike most of the first 
group approaches (i.e. lack of step-by-step 
traceability), our strategy forces traceable mapping 
from system specification to the reliability calculation 
through explicitly processes. Compared to the second 
group, our focuses on both behavioural and structural 
aspects while these approaches focus on the 
structural aspects rather than the behavioural. 
Table 2 summarizes our findings regarding current 
approaches for design-time reliability engineering. A 
check mark in parenthesis means that an approach 
partially supports the feature. 
 
 
7.0  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this paper, we presented a strategy for scalable 
modeling and calculation of scenarios reliability based 
on the system requirements specification. The work is 
applicable to the early design stage of the software 
life cycle. The major contribution lies on modeling 
scenarios in a scalable way by using a scenario 
language that describes system scenarios in a 
compact and concise manner potentially results in 
reduced number of scenarios. Another contribution lies 
in the calculation, where the well-known “divide and 
conquer” strategy is followed through the scenarios 
reliability calculation. Each part of the scenario is 
tackled separately in the calculation to achieve better 
traceability and avoid computational complexity in 
the case of having scenarios consisting of a large 
number of components. A finite state machine is used 
to truncate each scenario into its basic elements 
(component instances) and to reveal their internal 
states. In the reliability calculation, the failure 
probabilities of the operations within the component 
and operations’ invocations that exhibited in the 
scenarios are utilized as base for the scenario reliability. 
In summary, the proposed approach may enhance 
the ability of the current reliability approaches to deal 
with large software systems. 
There are several open issues for future work. It is 
notable that the scenario modeling and calculation 
presented here can be adopted by most of current 
approaches of reliability prediction. However, the 
combination of scenarios and their related 
assumptions (e.g. synchronization of execution among 
scenarios and within the one scenario) it can enhance 
more to match the capability of current software 
technology. Therefore in future studies, there is an 
intention to develop a system level reliability approach 
that can utilize the proposed scenarios’ treatments. 
Also, there is a plan to develop a mechanism for 
detecting any conflicts among scenarios; furthermore 
the automation of this process.  
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Table 2 Current approaches for design-time reliability 
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Singh et al. [31] √ × (√) × 
Rodrigues et al. [24] √ × × × 
Roshandel et al. [37] √ (√) × × 
M. Palviainen et al. [17] √ √ × × 
L.Cheung et al. [7] √ (√) (√) √ 
D. Cooray et al. [38] √ (√) (√) × 
Our work √ √ √ √ 
G
ro
u
p
 B
 
Reussner et al. [4] (√) (√) × × 
Brosch et al. [3] (√) (√) × × 
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